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Providing  information  for  decision  making  should  be  like  telling  a story.  You  need  to  know,  ﬁrst,  what
you  want  to say;  second,  whom  you are  addressing;  and  third,  how  to  match  the  message  and  audience.
However,  data  presentations  frequently  fail to follow  these  simple  principles.  To  illustrate,  we focus  on
presentations  of  probabilistic  information  that accompany  forecasts.  We  emphasize  that  the providers
of  such  information  often  fail to realize  that  their  audiences  lack  the  statistical  intuitions  necessary  to





prior  to  conceptualizing  different  ways  of  informing  people  about  the uncertainties  of  forecasts.  We
discuss  and compare  three  types  of  methods:  description,  simulation,  and  mixtures  of description  and
simulation.  We  conclude  by identifying  gaps  in  our  knowledge  on  how  best  to communicate  probabilistic
information  for decision  making  and  suggest  directions  for future  research.
©  2014  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.  Published  by Elsevier  Inc.  This  is an
 artic
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. Introduction
Upon arriving in continental Europe in the early 13th century,
ibonacci convinced people that the Hindu-Arabic numerical sys-
em was superior to Roman numerals for making calculations,
aintaining quantitative records and conveying information. His
ork essentially transformed the language in which analyses were
onducted and communicated and thereby contributed signiﬁ-
antly to both science and everyday life (Savage, 2009). Better
nderstanding of quantitative analyses eventually led to better
udgments and decisions.
We propose that providing information to help people make
ecisions can be likened to telling stories. First, the provider – or
tory teller – needs to know what he or she wants to say. Second,
t is important to understand characteristics of the audience as this
ffects how information is interpreted. And third, the provider must
atch what is said to the needs of the audience. Moreover, when it
omes to decision making, the provider should not tell the audience
hat to do. Instead, the latter should draw its own  conclusions. Thats, as in a well-crafted story, the audience should be free to interpret
he outcomes without being told the “message” directly (i.e., what
o do).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 935422561.
E-mail addresses: robin.hogarth@upf.edu (R.M. Hogarth),
mre.soyer@ozyegin.edu.tr (E. Soyer).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.01.005
211-3681/© 2014 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).le under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).
In this paper, we argue that our story telling metaphor does not
capture how information is typically presented for decision mak-
ing in applied settings. However, the metaphor captures principles
that can improve decision makers’ understanding of the situations
they face and their satisfaction with the alternatives they select.1
Our aim is to highlight and provide a perspective about these prin-
ciples, given possible methods of communicating information for
decision making. We  consider the standard method of description
and use it as a benchmark to discuss the beneﬁts and weaknesses
of an alternative approach: providing experience through simula-
tions. Finally, we  reﬂect on possible hybrid techniques that merge
descriptions and simulations. To make our ideas concrete, we con-
centrate here on the presentation of information about uncertainty
associated with taking different actions. However, we believe that
the principles apply across a wide range of types of problems.
Our interest in this issue was  stimulated by a survey we
conducted of how economists interpret the results of regres-
sion analysis (Soyer & Hogarth, 2012). In this study, academicabout making decisions in light of the results of a simple regression
analysis. The economists were given the outcomes of the regression
1 We emphasize that we use the term “story” in a metaphorical manner. Most
forecasts are, of course, not stories in that they lack characters and plots that evolve
across time. However, both forecasts and stories require transmitting information
in an accessible manner.




























































mation presented and they lack the ability to recognize this fact.
Consider publication bias (Ioannidis, 2005). Academic publications
make information part of the public domain; easily reachable by22 R.M. Hogarth, E. Soyer / Journal of Applied Re
nalysis in a typical, tabular format and the questions involved
nterpreting the probabilistic implications of speciﬁc actions given
he estimation results. Hence, the participants had available all the
nformation necessary to provide correct answers, but in general
hey failed to do so. Although their answers were inﬂuenced by the
ncertainties concerning the model’s regression coefﬁcients, they
ended to ignore the uncertainty involved in predicting the depend-
nt variable conditional on values of the independent variable. As
uch they vastly overestimated the predictive ability of the model.
ur survey also involved another group of similar economists who
nly saw a bivariate scatterplot of the data. These economists were
ccurate in answering the same questions.
Now academic economists typically do not use the results of
egression analysis for decision making purposes and thus per-
aps our survey was “unfair”. However, since these economists
ere statistical experts (econometricians), their poor performance
aises the issue of what people really understand when they consult
ata provided for decision making. Second, that one group made
ccurate answers after only seeing a scatterplot suggests that such
isplays could be used for better decision making. However, it is
ot clear that this suggestion would be accepted because, despite
he accuracy of their answers, members of this group complained
itterly that they did not have enough information to answer the
uestions adequately.
As an exercise in providing information for decision making, our
urvey was a failure. The story did not match with the audience.
n particular, the story in this case (regression results) was engi-
eered by the analyst, whose principal aim is typically not to be
nderstood (in terms of improving judgments and decisions) but
ust to be heard (published). If nothing else, our study showed that
ifferent descriptions of the same information, lead people to draw
ifferent conclusions – a phenomenon that has been documented
any times in the literature (Hogarth, 1982).
. Probabilistic forecasts – issues and challenges
In this paper, we consider the communication of probabilis-
ic forecasts. In essence, this means that the analyst provides the
ecision maker with a probability distribution over possible future
utcomes of a variable of interest. These can cover many differ-
nt types of applications. Consider, for example, simple forecasts
nvolving the weather (e.g., “Will it rain tomorrow?”) as opposed to
ore complicated issues such as effects of climate change (Budescu,
or, & Broomell, 2012). In the economic domain, one can envisage
orecasts involving sales and inventories, as well as outcomes of
nvestments. In politics, probabilistic forecasts can cover elections,
rading disputes, and so on.
We emphasize this range of applications because analysts and
ecision makers may  have quite different conceptions when they
onsider a description of a decision making situation. In particu-
ar, the meaning of probability is not clear to many in that it does
ot necessarily map  into people’s experience. For example, imagine
hat a decision maker is told that the probability of rain tomorrow
s 0.3. Now, let’s assume it does not rain the next day. How should
he interpret the meaning of the forecast? Was  it correct or incor-
ect? Our bemused decision maker is not sure because rain could
nly occur or not occur and a single trial cannot reveal whether a
.3 probability estimate is appropriate (Lopes, 1981). On the other
and, for a statistically sophisticated analyst, the 0.3 estimate can
e interpreted as a personal “degree of belief” (supported intellec-
ually by a Bayesian betting paradigm) or as the limit of a long-run
elative frequency (imagining many days when the weather condi-
ions were identical, i.e., as a frequentist statistician).
Given these issues, should analysts simply forget about numer-
cal estimates and instead use verbal statements that describe in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 221–228
feelings of uncertainty? Indeed, several studies show that verbal
expressions of probability (e.g., phrases such as “unlikely”, “almost
certain”, and so on) can be relatively effective (see, e.g., Budescu &
Wallsten, 1985). However, verbal expressions do not have exactly
the same meaning for different people and it is problematic to
generalize from these results.
A further problem in providing forecasts in the form of prob-
abilities to statistically naïve decision makers is that the latter
may  make assumptions of which the analysts are unaware. In a
revealing study, Gigerenzer, Hertwig, van den Broek, Fasolo, and
Katsikopoulos (2005) asked people what they thought was meant
by weather forecasts of the form “the probability of rain tomorrow
is 30%”. There was a wide range of different interpretations includ-
ing the possibility of having rain during 30% of the day and 30% of
the region receiving rain during that day.
At one level, these interpretations are amusing. However, it can
be argued that the statement the respondents were asked to inter-
pret was  ambiguous. What is missing is clariﬁcation of how one
would know whether or not it had rained on the morrow. Lacking
this insight, it is possible for people to have several interpretations
even if statistical experts would not think of them. Statements of
probabilities of events should be accompanied by operational def-
initions such that the occurrence or non-occurrence of the events
cannot be disputed. For example, if a person makes a bet conditional
on the occurrence of the event, he or she should not subsequently
be able to avoid responsibility by changing the deﬁnition of the
event.2
Finally, people may  differ not only in statistical expertise but also
expertise concerning the issue at hand, e.g., meteorologists know
much more about the weather than non-meteorologists. What is
unclear is whether such substantive expertise affects the ability to
interpret probabilistic forecasts.
3. Human information processing: strengths and
weaknesses
We  assume that, prior to providing probabilistic forecasts, the
analysts have made the appropriate analyses. This being said, we
now consider some human strengths and weaknesses in informa-
tion processing since it is important to understand the factors that
help and hinder people in the task of interpreting information.
Although research in psychology and neuroscience can lead one
to marvel at the capacity of the human mind, from our perspective,
there are limitations. In particular, limits on processing capacity
restrict our ability to “take in” all the information that may be rel-
evant to a problem. At any point in time, we  can only perceive a
small fraction of what is actually in our visual ﬁeld. Thus, anything
that attracts attention is important and the reality in which we
operate is bound by this attentional ﬁlter. Indeed the literature is
replete with examples of how minor shifts in the presentation of
information can change a person’s conclusions (Einhorn & Hogarth,
1981; Hogarth, 1982). To overcome such problems, through expe-
rience people have developed skills in seeking speciﬁc information
in particular situations so that attention can be guided appropri-
ately. Indeed, this lies at the heart of expertise (Ericsson & Smith,
1991).
A second limitation is that people often fail to consider relevant
information precisely because it does not form part of the infor-all consumers of knowledge. If certain analyses (those that ﬁnd
2 This betting criterion was originally suggested by Bruno de Finetti.





























































Fig. 1. Two  ways of calculating the probability that a woman  who tests positive
in  mammography screening actually has breast cancer (positive predictive value).
The left side illustrates the calculation with conditional probabilities, and the right
side with natural frequencies. The four probabilities at the bottom of the left tree
are  conditional probabilities, each normalized on base 100. The four frequencies at
the  bottom of the right tree are natural frequencies. The calculation using natural
frequencies is simpler (smiling face) because natural frequencies are not normalized
relative to base rates of breast cancer, whereas conditional probabilities (or relative
frequencies) are, and need to be multiplied by the base rates (the formula to calculate
the positive predictive value is known as Bayes’s rule).
Adapted from Fig. 3 in Gigerenzer et al. (2007, p. 56). Copyright 2007 by Sage Pub-R.M. Hogarth, E. Soyer / Journal of Applied Res
tatistically signiﬁcant effects) are more likely to be published than
thers (those that fail to ﬁnd effects), then the story, that is, the con-
lusion from the available evidence is as biased as the evidence on
hich it is based. Imagine, for instance, a physician contemplating
hether to prescribe a certain drug. Say, among the 20 publications
hat contain valid tests of the drug’s effectiveness, 17 demonstrate
ositive results. The verdict seems clear (17 vs. 3). If, however, there
re also 15 unpublished manuscripts with valid tests, of which 13
how no effects, the story now changes (19 vs. 16) and the decision
ecomes harder (for cases on selective publication, see Goldacre,
013; and Turner, Matthews, Linardatos, Tell, & Rosenthal, 2008).
Another important dimension is the distinction between
hether the information is presented at once – as in the typical
escription of a problem – or whether it has been acquired across
ime. As an example of the latter, imagine deciding between two
estaurants that are well known to you. In essence, you already have
stimates of “how good” both restaurants are based on past expe-
iences. Moreover, for each the estimates are based on aggregating
our experiences across time. That is, your estimates are based on
equential updating of the impressions of your different visits as
pposed to accumulating all the impressions at one time. Indeed,
ith a sequential updating process, all that you need to remember
s your last overall impression.
In short, limits on information processing are not so important
hen dealing with what we call sequential data. Indeed, numerous
tudies have demonstrated that people are remarkably effective at
xtracting aggregate frequencies from single events that they have
reviously experienced and encoded sequentially (Hasher & Zacks,
979, 1984; Zacks & Hasher, 2002).3 Moreover, this appears to be
 well-developed skill in that it shows little variation across the
ife cycle and is used in many different tasks. The fact that it has
een observed in several non-human species also suggests that it
s well anchored in evolution. From our perspective, it is important
ecause it shows the type of task environment in which humans
an overcome processing capacity constraints.
In summary, although subject to attentional shifts, human
nformation processing reacts accurately to information observed
equentially across time. However, the system is deﬁcient in that
t operates too “literally”. Many studies have shown that people
reat the data they see as representative of the processes that gen-
rate them, that is, they are “naïve” statisticians (Juslin, Winman &
ansson, 2007; Peterson & Beach, 1967). As a consequence, people
ake inferential errors due, inter alia, to “small sample” effects and
he failure to realize that samples can be biased in different ways.
ndeed, this failure to recognize and correct for biases has been
abeled a lack of “meta-cognitive” ability (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler,
rinkmann, Betsch, & Wild, 2000).
Clearly, lack of meta-cognitive ability coupled with the inability
o take account of missing data means that people’s judgments are
ften defective. Moreover, they are typically unaware of this fact.
n Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman (2011) discusses the notion
f WYSIATI (acronym for “what you see is all there is”), i.e., the
endency of humans to base their judgments predominantly on
he information that is readily available. Moreover, humans are
nclined to consider such available yet potentially biased informa-
ion as the whole story. Recognizing these issues, many attempts
ave been made to help people make more accurate judgments.
3 To illustrate, consider being asked how many times you have been to the cinema
n  the last three months. Most people can answer this question (albeit not always
ompletely accurately) despite the facts that (a) they did not know they were going
o  be asked this particular question, and (b) when they attended the cinema they did
ot make a conscious effort to record the frequency of their visits. Of course, we  do
ot claim that people have perfect memory. Survey researchers, for example, have
ocumented several patterns of systematic distortions (see, e.g., Bradburn, Rips, &
hevell, 1987).lications. Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications.
4. Varieties of decision aids
Almost all decision aids involve changing how problems are
described to help people make “better” decisions. The range of aids
varies from complex decision analytic techniques (involving deci-
sion trees, multi-attribute utility functions, and so on) to simply
reframing problems in order to direct attention in particular ways.
The latter approach is particularly interesting in that it combines
psychological insights of how people process information with an
understanding of the tasks they face.
A good example is the work of Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995)
who explored how to help people make so-called Bayesian updat-
ing inferences. Imagine, for instance, assessing the probability of
having a particular disease given a positive test result. The typical
presentation used in the description of these problems provides
the component probabilities that should be combined by Bayes’
theorem, i.e., the prior probability of having the disease and the
sensitivity and speciﬁcity of the test. Most people, however, are
quite confused about how to combine this information correctly.
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage argued that such confusion was  not sur-
prising given that people’s experience is not in the form of these
component probabilities but can be more accurately represented
by frequency data. Thus, if problems were described in terms of
“natural frequencies” people would both understand the data bet-
ter and be able to perform the necessary calculations more easily –
see Fig. 1.That people can learn to do Bayesian calculations using the nat-
ural frequency method has been well documented (Gigerenzer,
Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007; Sedlmeier &
























































Presentation of a regression analysis: Sample statistics and estimation results.
Sample statistics
Sample mean Standard deviation
Change in income 8.4 7.9
Investment 1 11.1 5.8
Investment 2 9.6 5.2
Estimation results (dependent variable: change in income)
Coefﬁcient estimate Standard error
Constant −0.1 0.15
Investment 1 0.5 0.20*
Investment 2 0.3 0.05*
R2 0.21
Number of observations (n) 100024 R.M. Hogarth, E. Soyer / Journal of Applied Re
igerenzer, 2001). However, this is but one solution to one speciﬁc
ype of inferential problem.
More recently, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) highlighted changing
he manner in which decision problems are described in a popular
ook entitled Nudge.  Their main argument is that there is often
onsiderable leeway in how choices are described. Thus, decisions
an be improved if a third party redeﬁnes problems and tells the
tory in an alternative way. One striking example involves helping
eople to invest more in pension plans by committing to save out
f future increases in salary as opposed to reducing current salary
Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). Since many pension plans are under-
unded, such “nudges” are important.
The implication of this approach is that in creating a nudge
omebody has to know what is “good” for the decision maker and
his can raise ethical issues that Thaler and Sunstein (2008) recog-
ize. Indeed, they describe their approach as libertarian paternalism.
hat is, although one problem presentation format has been cho-
en “paternalistically” for the decision maker (at least one has to be
hosen), people are still “free” to make their own choices and can
hange the problem format if they want.
. An alternative approach
Recent work in the psychology of judgment and decision making
as highlighted the fact that the information humans use for deci-
ion making can be conceptualized as having two distinct sources
Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
n the one hand, people acquire information about judgment and
ecision problems through description of the particulars of the sit-
ations involved. This is exactly the case of the Bayesian inference
roblems of Gigerenzer et al. (2007) described above and the work
f Thaler and Sunstein (2008).
On the other hand, people also learn about the speciﬁc fea-
ures of problems through experience of past instances. For example,
magine the owner of a supermarket who wonders how many cus-
omers will enter the store on a particular day of the week. Whereas
he owner could have some description of this problem, he or she
ndoubtedly has had experience of this situation from the past and
an call upon this experience to estimate the number of customers.
In brief, people can learn about the characteristics of judgment
nd decision problems through description or experience and, of
ourse, mixtures of the two. Most decision aiding has focused on
xploring effects of different problem descriptions and, as has been
hown, is important because human judgments and decisions are so
ensitive to different aspects of descriptions. At the same time, this
ery sensitivity is problematic in that different types of judgments
nd decisions seem to need different solutions (even though some
oncepts such as “loss aversion” have found wide applicability).
here is a need to ﬁnd methods with more general application.
We  suggest exploiting the well-recognized human ability to
ncode frequency information. That is, we consider the possibility
f transforming problems so that people learn about them through
xperience as opposed to description. We  argue that since deci-
ion and judgment problems involve outcomes (i.e., gains, losses,
stimates, etc.), being able to describe a problem also implies hav-
ng the information necessary to build a simulation model that can
e used to generate “outcomes” through a process that we call
simulated experience”.
. Experience vs. descriptionFrom the viewpoint of storytelling, simulated experience essen-
ially allows a decision maker to live actively through a decision
ituation as opposed to being presented with a passive descrip-
ion. A simple example would be the problem of estimating the(Data originally reported in Hogarth & Soyer, 2011, Fig. 5, p. 445).
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 95% conﬁdence level.
probability of obtaining, say a sum of four, when two  dice are
cast. This situation can be described by providing the structure
and parameters of the problem (two six sided dice, identical
shapes, having dots on each side representing numbers from one
to six), such that the correct answer can be calculated (analyt-
ical approach). Alternatively, an experiential approach could be
taken, casting the dice many times and observing the prevalence
of a certain outcome (sum of four) among many successive trials
(experiential approach).
In this particular example, the description is easy to understand
and the analytical approach would produce a precise and accurate
answer. The experiential approach, on the other hand, would be
time consuming, lead to a less precise response and require the
physical availability of two  dice. However, imagine what would
happen if the problem were more complicated. For example, con-
sider the task of estimating the probability that the product of the
outcomes is larger than eight when one of the dice has four sides
instead of six. Now, relative to an analytical approach, basing judg-
ments on experience would start to become easier and less error
prone due to lack of expertise in probability theory. Parenthetically,
we note that the difference between resolving problems that have
been described as opposed to experienced is related to Brunswik’s
(1952) distinction between the use of cognition and perception.
In the former, people can be quite accurate in their responses but
they can also make large errors. In the latter, they are unlikely to
be highly accurate but errors are likely to be small.
Both Lejarraga (2010) and Hogarth and Soyer (2011) suggest
that as the complexity of problems grows, experiential approaches
lead to improvements in judgments and decisions. In such cases,
people also trust their experiences more than their analytical intu-
itions. Consider, for instance, a scenario where decision makers
can make two  possible investments and then have to judge the
probability of different possible consequences of their actions, such
as ending up losing money, earning more or less than a certain
amount, or earning more than someone who did not make any
investments. When a regression analysis is conducted to determine
the yields of the investments, the description of the outputs would
usually include two tables, one with descriptive statistics and other
with estimation results (see Table 1).
Alternatively, a simulation can be built based on the estimated
model to allow users to enter their decisions (investments) and
observe model predictions as outcomes (see Fig. 2). A comparison
of judgments using these two approaches reveals that, regardless
of statistical sophistication, simulated experience leads to more
accurate perceptions about the uncertainties. Description, on the
other hand leads to an illusion of predictability, where the uncer-
tainty is underestimated due to the characterization of results
R.M. Hogarth, E. Soyer / Journal of Applied Research





































tLATE button is clicked, a predicted outcome (the change in income) is shown based
n  both the user’s inputs (investment choices) and the estimated parameters of the
odel.
ainly through the average coefﬁcient estimates. Hence, simulated
xperience provides a useful way of communicating such probabil-
ty estimates (Armstrong, 2012; Hogarth & Soyer, 2011; Hogarth
 Soyer, in press-a, in press-b). In order to identify when this
pproach should be preferred to description, however, we need to
iscuss the pros and cons of simulation methodology in the context
f judgment and decision making.
. Advantages of simulated experience
Let us ﬁrst consider the advantages.
.1. Simulation technology
There are no technological barriers to simulating complex pro-
esses. Just a decade ago, building simulations and using them was
 difﬁcult and slow endeavor. Today, the technology allows for the
onstruction of simulations for virtually any decision scenario and
an function quite rapidly.
.2. Ease of use
Our investigations show that people relate easily to the task of
imulating sequential outcomes and interact seamlessly with sim-
lations. Moreover, as problems grow more complex, they prefer
heir experiential intuitions over their analytical calculations.
.3. Statistical knowledge
Simulated experience can be employed even when the decision
aker has limited knowledge of statistics. For instance the descrip-
ion in Table 1 is foreign to anyone not familiar with regression
nalysis. On the other hand, a simulation based on such results can
e used by anyone who  has previously operated a calculator or a
imple spreadsheet.
.4. Freedom of choice
If the experience produced by the simulation is kind (i.e., abun-
ant, unbiased and immediate, Hogarth, 2001, 2010) then the
xperiential approach provides the decision maker with a complete
icture of the outcomes of a process rather than a frame that nudges
er to a particular choice. Clearly, simulated experience needs a
imulation to be built (by a third party or in some cases even the
ecision maker) but this is not a particular statement of the problem
hat has been selected by somebody else in the guise of libertarian
aternalism..5. Active participation in the decision process
Relatedly, simulated experience makes sure that, by building
he simulation or simply by sampling experience, decision makers in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 221–228 225
actively participate in the decision making process. This can lead to
increased understanding of the relation between their actions and
the consequent outcomes.
8. Disadvantages of simulated experience
Simulated experience also has some disadvantages and provides
several challenges for future research.
8.1. Sample size
Simulated experience allows decision makers to determine the
number of trials they wish to experience. Hence, sample size
becomes an important factor in the precision of judgments. This
leads to asking what affects people’s choice of sample size and what
constitutes the optimal number of observations (Hertwig & Pleskac,
2010).
8.2. Rare events
The literature on the so-called “decision-experience gap”
suggests that whereas Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) description-
based prospect theory implies overweighting of small probabilities,
decisions based on experience are consistent with underweighting
(Hertwig et al., 2004). By deﬁnition, rare events will not be expe-
rienced often in simulations with the consequence that decision
makers might not pay much attention to these when making judg-
ments and decisions. One way to overcome this problem would be
to use conditional simulations. For example, consider a Bayesian
updating problem. If the simulation is built for incidents condi-
tional on a certain prior event, then the rare outcomes would be
more visible (e.g., the probability of having a disease, given a pos-
itive result in a medical test; or the possibility of a loss beyond a
certain amount, given the occurrence of a natural disaster).
8.3. Risk attitudes
Some research has shown that the effect of simulated expe-
rience, as opposed to description, is less risk aversion in choice.
Kaufmann, Weber, and Haisley (2013) argued that, for investment
portfolio choices, such risk attitudes are more in line with rational
choice theory. However, since people may  have legitimate reasons
to have different risk attitudes for single as opposed to repeated
choices, the issue of how risk attitudes are affected by simulation
experience needs to be investigated.
8.4. Statistical sophistication
Simulated experience does not require statistical sophistication
on the part of the user. Thus, its beneﬁts are larger in contexts
where the analysis is complicated and hard to describe to some-
one with limited prior knowledge in statistics. However, the user
still needs to be introduced to the simulation interface and trained
in its operation. One key issue is sample size (see also above). In
our experiments, statistically sophisticated people sampled consis-
tently more information, which, in turn, led to better judgments.
Simulation training should include information on the law of large
numbers.
8.5. Trust in the modelUsers should trust the models they use for simulated experience.
At present, little is known about the determinants of such trust.
The same, of course, is also true for descriptions. Future research
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rust descriptions and explanations by experts as well as experi-
nces based on simulations. In terms of user satisfaction, recent
nalyses by Goldstein, Johnson, and Sharpe (2008) and Kaufmann
t al. (2013) suggest that sampling increases both comprehension
nd satisfaction about decisions under uncertainty.
.6. Simulation building
The method of simulated experience requires both a simula-
or based on the underlying decision situation and a user-friendly
nterface. Although popular spreadsheet software, such as MS
xcel, can provide viable bases for such simulations, one still needs
ome proﬁciency in programming to build a reliable decision tool.
o solve this, a platform of simulations can be created that includes
 set of simulations for a variety of relevant situations. Moreover,
uch a platform might also incorporate modules that users can
ransform and combine to create custom simulations. For instance,
ifferent modules might allow users to select from a variety of
odel speciﬁcations (e.g., distributions with fat tails, skewed dis-
ributions, etc.).
.7. Knowledge transfer
This paper discusses the simulated experience methodology as
 means to communicate information to decision makers and we
ave limited our discussions to matters of presentation. However,
 weakness of simulation technology could be that the decision
aker does not gain insight into the problem structure that can be
eneralized. On the other hand, in our experiments we  observed
hat, when able to consult both a description and a simulation,
eople’s analytical calculations improved (Hogarth, Mukherjee, &
oyer, 2013; Hogarth & Soyer, 2011). Their experiences provided a
eans to check the accuracy of their analysis.
. Simulated experience instead of description
Description is typically the default mode of providing infor-
ation for decision making. Thus, when should it be replaced by
imulated experience? Our discussion on experience vs. description
ighlights two major shortcomings of every description. First, it
lways involves a frame, and thus different descriptions might lead
o different perceptions and decisions. Second, for some problems
hat incorporate uncertainties or complex structures, descriptions
ight be hard to construct or obscure a crucial part of the story.
imulated experience essentially takes description out of the pic-
ure; hence it should substitute descriptions in situations where
hese shortcomings are prevalent.
.1. Uncertainties
Describing uncertainties inherent in a decision situation is dif-
cult. Examples include situations where outcomes are subject to
egression toward the mean or when a variable is a complex func-
ion of many independent variables and prediction errors.
In a series of experiments we have found that in scenarios
imilar to that described in Table 1, descriptions lead people to
verestimate the predictability of the dependent variable. The
ain reason behind this illusion of predictability is that descrip-
ion frames the question mainly around average effects (Hogarth &
oyer, 2011; Soyer & Hogarth, 2012). More importantly, our results
uggest that augmenting the description with experience, e.g., let-
ing decision makers experience simulated outcomes on top of a
escription, does not lead to better perceptions. This is because
eople are used to relying primarily on descriptions. It was  only
hen we eliminated the description and constrained the decision in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 221–228
makers to only visualize simulated outcomes that their judgments
improved.
9.2. Complex structures
In problems with complex probabilistic structures, descriptions
may not only be hard to decipher, they could also mislead one’s
analysis of the situation. Consider for instance the birthday problem
(i.e., What is the probability that two  or more people have the same
birthday in a group of N people?) and the famous Monty Hall prob-
lem. Research has repeatedly shown that attempts to solve these
problems analytically lead to biased answers largely because peo-
ple ﬁnd it difﬁcult to understand the problem structures (Hogarth
& Soyer, 2011).
In these situations, decision makers can be provided with sim-
ulations that let them live through the problems many times
(learning the birthdays of multiple groups of N people in the birth-
day problem, and selecting one door among three in the Monty hall
problem). In this way, users learn about the outcome probabilities
through experience, without resorting to any bias-prone analyses.
Similarly, simulations have been shown to be useful for mitigating
base rate neglect (Hayes, Newell, & Hawkins, 2013), and assessing
probabilities of success in competitions (Hogarth et al., 2013).
10. Hybrid approaches
In our experiments, participants often showed discontent when
they lacked access to descriptions, even when such access biased
their judgments. Hence, advocating for the abolition of descrip-
tions in certain situations is not realistic. Also, considering that both
description and simulation have advantages and disadvantages it
is important to investigate where these methods might be used
together for optimal storytelling.
10.1. Graphs
One tool that merges descriptions with simulation is a graph
of simulated outcomes that result from the described model. Such
a plot would follow the description of the problem and include
individual level data (simulated or real) that makes visible the
uncertainty inherent in the outcomes. Advances in computing
technology have facilitated the way  we design and use graphi-
cal illustrations. Recent research shows that in relevant situations,
such as medical decision making, depicting individual data through
interactive graphics that allow decision makers to visualize simu-
lated outcomes help probabilistic understanding (Ancker, Chan, &
Kukafka, 2009; Ancker, Weber, & Kukafka, 2011). Moreover, news
media and online communities make use of a broad selection of
diagrams and infographics to inform their readers about a wide
variety of statistics (for a comprehensive review and examples of
such approaches, see Spiegelhalter, Pearson, & Short, 2011).
Although plotting individual level data is increasingly con-
venient and straightforward, a survey we conducted of applied
economics publications in prestigious academic journals reveals
that approximately only 40% of the analyses that can provide scatter
plots actually do so (Soyer & Hogarth, 2012). Moreover, a part of
these displays are limited to mainly showing average trends.
Fig. 3 shows how providing simulated outcomes at the individ-
ual level in graphs would lead to better perceptions of uncertainty.
In all three ﬁgures, the straight line depicts the estimated average
relation between variables X and Y, which is one-to-one and the
same in all three cases. The difference between Fig. 3a and b is due
to different levels of uncertainty at the individual level; the pre-
dictability of Y from X is lower in the former due to larger variation
at the individual level. Finally, in Fig. 3c uncertainty at the individual
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1ig. 3. (a–c) The average effect of X on Y (the straight line). (a and b) Simulated indivi
f  Y conditional on values of X is larger than that of the scenario depicted in (b). (c)
evel is hidden and the graph only displays the estimated average
ffect.
A weakness of this visual approach is that it oversimpliﬁes the
nalysis by reducing the whole story to a graph between two
ariables. Most of the analyses in applied work involve multiple
ariables and factors that interact in complex fashion to produce
he outcomes. However, we argue that the presence of even a sim-
le plot showing the predicted outcomes given different levels
f an independent variable conditional on the mean vales of the
emaining control variables would help the decision maker avoid
eveloping an illusion of predictability.
0.2. Add-on simulations
When used for decision making, presenting results in the form
llustrated in Table 1 leads to illusions of predictability. Moreover,
he importance of this ﬁnding is accentuated by the fact that this
resentation method is prevalent in most scientiﬁc studies, and
specially in applied economics. Publications in these domains
ight therefore consider featuring online simulations to accom-
any articles that have decision making or prediction implications.
uch simulations would be based on the estimated model and allow
eople to live through the problem many times by sequentially
bserving potential outcomes given their inputs. Moreover, this
ould not disrupt the content of the description. Indeed, these add-
n simulations would constitute a much needed bridge between
cientiﬁc analyses and decision making activities.
0.3. Sparklines
In their creator Edward Tufte’s words, sparklines are “small,
igh-resolution graphics usually embedded in a full context of
ords, numbers, images. (They) are datawords: data-intense,
esign-simple, word-sized graphics” (Tufte, 2006, p. 47). In other
ords, sparklines are within-text-plots that replace words when
onveying statistical information. These plots usually have no num-
ers or axes on them. Their purpose is to make the data and its
istribution readily available for quick and easy inspection.
Such items are still not employed in academic or popular
ritings, even though they provide genuine insights about the
ata, without requiring discussion about their statistical properties
hrough a separate table or visual display. Consider the following
wo examples:
. “The Lakers’ 2004 season was
their last with Shaq, when they reached the NBA ﬁnals and
lost to Detroit (note the last 3 losses which sealed their fate
in the ﬁnals). Compare those days of glory with their abysmal
2005 performance, with only 2 wins inbservations (n = 300). In the scenario depicted in (a), the variance of the uncertainty
ot depict such uncertainty.
the last 21 games” (top, gray lines represent wins, bottom, black
ones represent losses, Gheorghiu, 2005).
2. People show difﬁculty in judging the chances of success in com-
petitions. Whereas the probabilities of winning are distributed
, the judgments reveal that decision makers act as if
they are (Soyer & Hogarth, in preparation).
This result suggests that an efﬁcient methodology to present
information to decision makers would include a combination of
description and simulation.
11. Discussion or “back to storytelling”
We have discussed how information gathered by an analyst
is communicated to parties who  will use it for decision making.
Although our initial observations result from casual empiricism,
our general contention is that such information is not always com-
municated satisfactorily. Moreover, we  contend that much could
be gained by respecting norms of good storytelling. At a minimum,
this involves knowing: (1) precisely what one wants to say, that
is, the message; (2) relevant characteristics of the decision maker,
that is, the audience; and (3) how to match the message to the
audience. In general, the analyst should not be telling the decision
maker what to do but instead provide information that allows the
decision maker to reach his or her own  conclusions.
As a speciﬁc example, we  focused on probabilistic information
that accompanies forecasts. As noted, this encompasses a wide
range of activities ranging from simple weather forecasts to out-
comes of medical procedures, ﬁnancial decisions, climate change,
and so on. We  pointed out that many people have deﬁcient notions
of probabilistic reasoning. For example, there is much ignorance
about the meaning of probability and what conclusions can be
drawn from data. We also noted that, although limited as informa-
tion processors, humans are adept at estimating the frequencies of
events they have experienced sequentially. However, they tend to
treat samples as “representative” and lack “meta-cognitive” ability
to correct for biased observations.
To date, attempts to help people understand probabilistic
forecasts or reasoning (i.e., to match message and audience)
have mainly involved describing problems in alternative ways
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Instead,
we suggest building on people’s ability to understand and encode
frequency data by having them experience simulated outcomes or,
what we  call “simulated experience”. Importantly, this requires
that the decision maker plays an active role in the communication
process. Moreover, in all the cases that we have examined, such
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The use of simulated experience to inform decision makers of
he probabilistic implications of predictions is in its infancy. Above,
e outlined different conceptual and methodological challenges
hat still need to be resolved. In our view, good storytelling will
nvolve both description and simulation, thereby harnessing the
dvantages of both. At a more general level, the challenge we  face
s to develop understanding of when information should be pre-
ented as description, experience, or both. For example, we know
hat complexity favors experience over description but we need to
e able to deﬁne boundary conditions.
Finally, following Fibonacci’s advice to adopt the Hindu-Arabic
umerical system, humans have progressed substantially in their
bility to encode, store, and manipulate data. Indeed, the current
xplosion of “big data” owes much to having an appropriate numer-
cal system and much will be gained by those who can interpret
his new trove of information. However, since interpretation will
lways be a human activity, future progress will depend on how
e cope with this bottleneck. We  suggest that exploiting people’s
bility to process simulated experience is one way to enhance the
se of intuition in organizational decision making.
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